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The analysis of domestic pull (demand) factors in Latin  Ameri­
can indebtedness cycles centers m ainly on issues of public debt 
m anagem ent.2 Only recently have there been some attem pts at 
establishing connections between public debt problems and do­
mestic private capital m arkets, especially for the early inde­
pendent period.3 However, it is widely assum ed th a t domestic 
demand factors had a small role to play in Latin  American 
debts. According to this view, in ternational push (supply) fac­
tors seem to have been determ inant in Latin  American debt 
crises (M arichal 1989: 7; Stallings 1987: 48-49).
There are, however, several problems w ith focusing exclusive­
ly on public and external factors of Latin American debts. In the 
first place, im portant characteristics of domestic private finance 
are lost or overshadowed. Secondly, an insufficient understand­
ing of the interaction between public and private finance u n ­
dermines a proper perspective of the social and national in te r­
ests behind domestic financial and m onetary policies. And 
thirdly, there is a tendency to exaggerate the im portance of pub­
lic debt finance w ithin the larger issue of the im pact of modern 
capitalist finance on Latin American economic development.
1 Research in  Spain was possible thanks to a g ran t by the  American Philosophical So­
ciety and in Peru  thanks to a PSC-CUNY g ran t 1989.
2 Failure or success of debt strategies have been correctly associated w ith deficitary or 
developm ental use of public finance (Fishlow 1985a: 385).
3 C arm agnani (1983), Am aral (1988), Tenenbaum  (1986b), Gootenberg (1989b), Quiroz 
(1987), Lewis (1983).
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W ith such considerations in mind, this study evaluates the 
effects of public debt on the overall financial structu re of Peru 
in two export cycles, the m ature Guano Age (1850-1879) and the 
agro-export recovery after the W ar of the Pacific (1884-1914). 
Did the term s and use of public indebtedness facilitate or, on 
the contrary, impede the capacity of native financial in s titu ­
tions and élites to allocate financial resources w ith efficiency? 
In other words, did the relationship between public and private 
finance contribute or not to the promotion of development?4
Some answ ers to these questions will be suggested here 
through the analysis of domestic in terests and comparisons be­
tween two contrasting export cycles. Special a ttention will be 
given to four s tructu ra l variables affected by debt strategies: fi­
nancial institu tional development, effectiveness of financial in­
term ediation, m onetary conditions, and w ealth distribution. 
This chapter will show th a t the disproportionate public in­
debtedness of the Guano Period deeply disturbed the overall fi­
nancial development in Peru, while the modest public debt dur­
ing the agro-export recovery allowed better institu tional (but 
not distributive) conditions for the evolution of the domestic fi­
nancial structu re and its developmental effects.
The historical interaction between the public and private sec­
tors in the economic development of Peru has been addressed 
from different perspectives. On the one hand, authors like Mal- 
pica (1977), Yepes del Castillo (1972: 184) and Bonilla (1974: 63) 
argue th a t an incapable economic and financial (liberal) élite 
controlled and mism anaged the state 's finances in order to ad­
vance the ir own in terests in collaboration w ith foreign capital. 
A lternatively, H unt (1985: 257) views the economic stagnation
4 I assum e here th a t private initiative and activity is an essential component of the 
process of capitalist development. T hat m eans, it is very difficult for a s ta te  to sub­
stan tia lly  replace the role of the private sector in a capitalist economy and society 
w ithout causing considerable distortions (McKinnon 1973). On the other hand, I also 
assum e th a t  the state 's participation in building or regulating national infrastructural 
works, educational and health  services, or w ealth distribution, is essential in the pro­
cess of development conceived in its w ider sense, i. e. the  well being of the  m ajority of 
the  population (Ranis e t al. 1984: 145-181).
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in n ineteenth  century Peru as due to overwhelming structura l 
inelasticities and poor public investm ent decisions; likewise, 
Gootenberg (1989a) and M athew (1981) explain th a t trad ition­
al, protectionist and "nationalist" forces under urgent fiscal 
needs acted against adequate liberal trade policies and modern 
private and public financial m anagem ent. I consider tha t, with 
some modifications, to account for the two export and financial 
cycles under study, the views of H unt, Gootenberg and M athew 
explain more adequately the evidence produced by research on 
the issue.
The specific relationship between Peruvian private and pub­
lic debt finance had its roots in the colonial order. Thus, before 
discussing the 1850-1879 and 1884-1914 periods, the chosen 
historical approach necessitates a brief discussion of the pre- 
1850 situation in order to establish the context of the private- 
public interaction.
1. C o lo n ia l D eb t H er ita g e
The origins of the Peruvian public debt are found in the late 
colonial period. At this time the colonial sta te  and the official 
m erchant guild replaced ecclesiastical control of key colonial 
credit mechanisms.
Private credit contracts had been fairly common since the be­
ginning of the Spanish colonies in order to overcome m onetary 
scarcity (Greenow 1983; Brading 1971). Credit was essential to 
the working of the local colonial economy and investm ent, since 
Spanish colonial trade and the government needed to export 
specie to pay for im ports and make rem ittances to Spain. E n­
demic m onetary scarcity had been supplem ented by several 
credit m echanisms -  m ainly colonial mortgages (censos) and 
notarial loans (escrituras) -  since the beginning of the Spanish 
colonies. Periodic extractions of bullion and m onetary m anip­
ulations, such as the 1772-1783 re-m inting of 10.5 million pesos 
of locally debased coins (moneda m acuquina) which were re­
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duced to only 2.7 million pesos fuertes,5 added to the circulation 
problems of the local economy.
The Spanish im perial sta te  started  a series of reforms which 
tried to em ulate financial arrangem ents in England. In 1782 
the first central bank of Spain, the Banco de San Carlos, was 
created to support the financing of Spanish w ar efforts through 
the issue of royal interest-bearing notes (vales reales).6 In ter­
national and domestic conflicts fostered the increasing role of 
the sta te  in colonial finances.
Ecclesiastical credit was the first casualty of the Bourbon fi­
nancial reforms in late-colonial Peru: the expropriation of Jesu it 
properties in 1767, the consolidation of vales reales (1806-1809), 
and the abolition of the Inquisition (1813-1815) achieved a par­
tial disentailm ent of ecclesiastical liens and land property in 
favor of a stronger fiscal and commercial presence in credit 
m atters. The Bourbon determ ination for reform set an impor­
ta n t precedent in the relation between public and private fi­
nancial in terests.
Censos on landed estates accounted for 76 percent of a total 
of 587,679 pesos in expropriated Jesu it credits in 1769, and 51 
percent of a total of one million pesos in censos pertain ing to the 
Caja de Censos de Indios of Lima between 1757-1781.7 Approxi­
m ately 70 percent of those who bought the expropriated Jesu it 
estates from the colonial sta te  were m erchants (Aljovín de 
Losada 1990).
The consolidación de vales reales was particularly  objected to 
by large sections of the creole élite, especially by the Lima town 
council (cabildo) and im portant landowners. The m easure was 
an a ttem pt by the Crown to back its depreciating royal notes 
w ith liquid funds obtained from private debtors of ecclesiastical 
liens in Spain and its colonies. By decree the royal government 
became the single debtor of ecclesiastical liens, and compelled
5 Mercurio Peruano (Lima), no. 27 (Lima 1791), p. 250; sim ilar m onetary aspects in
1686 and 1786 are discussed in Moreyra-Paz Soldán (1980: 153-155, 257-259).
6 Anes Alvarez et al. (1970); Dickson (1967); Riley (1980: 165-174).
7 AHN, Jesuitas-Lim a, libro 443; AGNL, Juzgado General de Censos, legs. 31-93.
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the former debtors to repay these old ecclesiastical credits to 
newly appointed consolidation officers instead of to creditor ec­
clesiastical institutions. In Peru the consolidation uprooted from 
debtor private properties approxim ately 1.5 million pesos be­
tween its introduction, in 1806, and its in terruption in 1808 af­
te r incessant native protest. The cessation of the m easure did 
not impede the shipping of approxim ately 1.3 million pesos in 
consolidation proceeds to Spain in 1809. Consequently colonial 
mortgage loan in terests increased from 3-4 percent to 5-6 per­
cent.8
Thus, the traditional forms of mortgage credit granted by ec­
clesiastical institutions and by official Indian funds (Caja de 
Censos) to traditional colonial landowners were seriously up­
set. However, new fiscal debt mechanisms under the adm inis­
tration  of the m erchants' guild (Consulado) were introduced.
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the finan­
cial relationship between the state  and the m erchant guild had 
been based on monopoly rights and privileges granted to the 
guild in exchange for "services" to the crown, which included do­
nations, forced loans and loans w ithout interest. G radually how­
ever, the proceeds of new trade taxes farm ed by the Consulado 
were used as guarantees to repay loans to the sta te  by m er­
chants and other private lenders. Additionally, beginning in 
1777 these public loans were entitled to 3-6 percent annual in­
te rest.9
After 1750 trade and m ining production increased in the Pe­
ruvian colony.10 By 1800 the Lima m erchants had m anaged to 
channel funds of traditional lenders into the enhanced com­
8 "Expediente sobre la venta de los bienes de obras pías en los reinos de Indias," AGI, 
Gobierno, Lima, leg. 769; le tter by Diego Miguel Bravo de Lagunas, 12 Oct. 1811, 
"Amortización y consolidación 1780-1830," AGI, Indiferente, leg. 1702; Abascal to 
P resident of Castilla, 8 Apr. 1809, AGI, Gobierno, Lima, leg. 738.
9 "Toda Imposición, 1819," AGNL, T ribunal del Consulado, serie H-3, leg. 349, libro 
1237A; "Informe que presenta la comisión de la deuda española y secuestros," 20 
Feb. 1865, BNL, Ms., 1865-D2845; "Sobre el préstam o del millón y medio," AGI, 
Consulados, leg. 794.
10 Fisher (1977), (1985); Mercurio Peruano, no. 1 (Lima 1791), pp. 1-7; no. 23 (Lima 
1791); pp. 209-216.
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mercial activities as cater well as for the state 's fiscal needs. 
The escritura de riesgo, a sort of m erchant credit and insurance 
instrum ent, made possible inter-oceanic commercial transac­
tions by establishing a contract between the lender (who as­
sumed the responsibility of any loss or risk) and the m erchant 
(who used the loaned am ount to buy merchandise), a t high lev­
els of interest. M erchants were thus able to raise working capi­
ta l w ithout having to engage directly in unreliable m ining fi­
nance (avío) or advances for the purchase of silver (rescate).11
However, between 1751 and 1774 the premio, or in terest of 
escritura loans, declined from 65 percent to 16 percent because 
of increased trade and competition in trade financing.12 Lima 
m erchants protested against the erosion of their monopoly priv­
ileges and against m erchant bankruptcies which occurred as a 
resu lt of the relative over-supply in the colonial m arket. Repar­
tos de mercancías, the forced distribution of im ported and local 
produce among the Indian population, was ju s t a tem porary so­
lution -  backed by local credit chains -  to the rise in the supply 
of imports. More satisfying arrangem ents in order for the Lima 
m erchants to m aintain  some of their monopoly control included 
the formation of a regional closed m arket comprising Lima, 
Guayaquil and Chile, and the creation of new trade taxes to 
guarantee public loans (Flores Galindo 1984; Anna 1979: 120).
Peru was one of the last Hispanic American colonies in South 
America to become independent. A relatively solid system of 
public in ternal indebtedness, which had its roots in the late 
eighteenth century and which was strengthened by viceroy Fer­
nando de Abascal in the early nineteenth century, constituted 
the financial basis of Spanish resistance to independence.13 
The local private sector -  especially m erchants -  was the main 
creditor of a sta te  th a t offered fiscal revenues as collateral for
11 AGI, Gobierno, Lima, legs. 860, 874, 913; AHN, Consejos, leg. 20.319.
12 "El Consulado y comercio del Perú...,'1 1774, AGI, Gobierno, Lima, leg. 874.
13 Rodríguez Casado and Calderón Quijano (1944); M endiburu (1931-38); Anna (1979: 
114-119). Anna's argum ent of the extreme poverty of the Peruvian colony as a factor 
for Peruvian independence "by default" explains better the period 1815-1821 than  
the  fiscal and public debt reforms between 1777 and 1815.
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cash advances. According to a sample of the colonial fiscal debt 
shown in Table 1, m erchants held 26 percent, aristocrats and 
rentiers 21, and ecclesiastical institutions 17 percent of a total 
of 3.6 million pesos between 1777 and 1819. Colonial taxation 
on trade, silver production and tobacco as well as -  despite its 
tem porary abolition between 1811 and 1815 -  the Indian head 
tax (tributo indígena) lasted until the end of the colonial order 
and beyond.
A degree of tru s t or loyalty existed among the Peruvian cred­
itors of the Spanish king. Perhaps the introduction of interest- 
bearing loans guaranteed by imposiciones (pledges) of new fis­
cal rents (new trade taxes such as ordenanza, corsarios, derecho 
patriótico, subvención, and arbitrios14), adm inistrated  by the 
Consulado since 1777, contributed also to this public confidence. 
Abascal was certainly aw are of the need both to provide ade­
quate security and in terest to local creditors and to exploit their 
fidelity to the crown (fidelism o) (Nieto Velez 1960: 115-135). 
One independence fighter observed in 1823 th a t "the blood and 
treasures of the land of the sun were used to extinguish the sa­
cred fire set alight by the love of independence" (Monteagudo 
1823).
W ith independence, the relative tru s t in the sta te  as debtor 
completely disappeared together w ith the organizing principle 
of the tax  structure. The considerable am ount owed by the colo­
nial sta te  to the private sector would not be honored by the new 
republican government. In the official surrender of the Spanish 
army to the independent arm y on 9 December 1824 the fate of 
the colonial debt was discussed: the defeated Spanish officials 
w anted the new government to honor the debt, while the vic­
torious side dictated th a t a future independent Congress would 
decide on the issue.15 In August 1831 the Peruvian Congress 
recognized in principle the right of colonial creditors. In 1851 
there was a serious attem pt by corrupt officials to in tegrate this
14 Taxes created as pa rt of Abascal's fiscal reforms in 1815 which charged one peso for 
each w heat "fanega" imported and 5 % on rents of Lima's propiedades rústicas.
15 "Deuda española liquidada h asta  1821," BNL, 1865-D12853.
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Table 1: Sample of Main Creditors of the Colonial 
S tate in Peru  by Social Sectors, 1777-1819
Pesos %
1. M erchants 930,444 26
2. Aristocrats and rentiers 766,499 21
3. Eccl. insts. and clergy 624,172 17
4. F ratern ities (legas) 248,049 7
5. Charities 152,977 4
6. M unificent insts. 114,963 3
7. M ilitary 95,600 3
8. Lenders (prestamistas) 88,000 3
9. O thers (bureaucrats, etc.) 164,305 5
10. Not classified 400,276 11
Total 3,584,885 100
Sources: "Toda Imposición, 1819," AGNL, Tribunal del 
Consulado, serie H-3, leg. 349, libro 1237A; AGNL, 
Protocolos Notariales.
Table 2: Total Colonial Public Debt by Type of Creditors and Debts, 
Official Classification, 1821 (in Pesos)
Creditors Consulado Consolidación Tobacco Totals %
1. P rivate indivs. 4,989,484 394,756 5,384,240 44
2. Chaplain/cults 1,237,297 684,012 725,331 2,646,640 22
3. M onasteries 585,934 450,028 1,434,234 2,470,196 20
4. S tate eccl. funds 203,907 105,453 829,639 1,138,999 9
6. Munificence 232,252 21,252 69,112 322,616 3
5. Hospitals 226,528 20,840 36,753 284,121 2
Totals 7,475,402 1,281,585 3,489,825 12,246,812 100
Source: "Informe que presenta la comisión de la deuda española y secues­
tros," 20 Feb. 1865, BNL, 1865/D2845.
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"old debt of the Spanish government" to the national debt.16 
The unsettled  debt also became a major issue in the Spanish- 
Peruvian conflict of 1864-1866 (Peru 1864: 4, 18). However, the 
colonial debt was never actually repaid.
It was calculated th a t the total outstanding debt which the 
colonial sta te  owed to the private sector in 1821 am ounted to 
12.2 million pesos,17 i. e. estim ated in 1865 a t approxim ately 
£2.5  million (compared to a total public external debt of £ 9 m il­
lion in the same year). As shown in Table 2, 44 percent of the 
1821 debt was owed to private individuals and 42 percent to re ­
ligious institu tions and pious funds. The am ount of the debt is 
considerable if we take into account th a t the funds invested in 
ren ts by the major institutions in Lima were approxim ately 12.7 
million pesos in 1815 (Anna 1979: 114). Moreover, a policy of 
expropriations (secuestros) of private Spanish assets, considered 
necessary to stop private aid to the loyalist army, was practiced 
between 1821 and 1823. According to the zealous anti-Spaniard 
Bernardo Monteagudo, the num ber of Spaniards in Lima was 
reduced from 10,000 to only 600 between 1820 and 1823.18
The total am ount expropriated from Spaniards and their 
supporters is difficult to assess. Expropriations were m ainly of 
landed and urban  property, as well as private and public credit 
documents, ra th e r than  cash. Approximately 43 haciendas, 
some of them  valued a t 400,000 and 500,000 pesos, were taken 
over by the sta te  from original Spanish or pro-Spanish owners 
in the central coastal region only. The expropriated landed 
estates were given as a rew ard to m ilitary officers who had led
16 E l Peruano (Lima, Ju ly  3, 1851).
17 "Deuda española liquidada h asta  1821," BNL, Ms., 1865-D12853. Post-1821 Spanish 
government debts and secuestro am ounts not included.
18 Monteagudo (1823); "Informe que presenta la Comisión de la deuda española y se­
cuestros," 20 Feb. 1865, BNL, Ms., 1865-D2845; and "Expediente relativo al acopio y 
organización de datos de la deuda española antigua y secuestros" (based on docu­
m ents of the  Tribunal de Cuentas, Dirección del Crédito Nacional and Tesorería De­
partam ental, as well as 268 cases of secuestros), Feb. 1865, BNL, Ms., 1865-D2811; 
Flores Galindo (1984: 220).
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the independence army, among them  Antonio Sucre, Bernardo 
O'Higgins, Blas Cerdeña, José M aría Plaza and o thers.19
The new independent sta te  weakened to the extrem e the 
private sector of the old colonial order. The tax  structure was 
in shambles, depending on insufficient im port and silver mint 
taxes and, un til its final abolition in 1854, the Indian head tax. 
W ar costs, the costly presence of Colombian troops, and fiscal 
disorder forced the republican state  to appeal for the first time 
to foreign loans.
2. E a r ly  P o s t-In d e p e n d e n c e  D eb ts
The first foreign loans of a total am ount of £ 1,816,000 were 
raised in London in 1822 and 1825 and defaulted as early as 
April 1826.20 This Anglo-Peruvian debt rem ained in default 
until 1849 when the new revenues of guano, a fertilizer and ex­
port product in growing dem and in European agriculture, 
allowed sufficient funds for the conversion (refinancing) of the 
1820s debt which by 1849 had accrued to £ 3.7 million. The 
early recourse to foreign public credit resulted in failure due to 
an excessive optimism with regard to the new state 's capacity 
to repay, and the political and m ilitary pressures of the strug ­
gle for independence. After the 1826 default the sta te  had no 
alternative but to rely on traditional forms of in ternal finance.
Between 1826 and 1849 the Peruvian state, which lacked re ­
sources and foreign credit, depended on a series of emergency 
financial m echanism s (m erchant forced loans and abonos, or 
advanced paym ents of customs rights)21, and internal, privi­
19 Quiroz (1987: 29-30); Engelsen (1977: 10); Burga (1976: 148). Some of these proper­
ties were la te r given back to former owners or compensated for through in ternal 
debt mechanisms.
20 Palacios Moreyra (1983: 29-31, 38); M athew (1970). A sim ilar case for Mexico is 
analyzed by Liehr (1983).
21 Gootenberg (1989b: chap. 5); Tribunal del Consulado, "Expediente relativo a la rela­
ción de comerciantes de abono para  el pago de derechos de aduana," BNL, Ms., 
1866-D2810.
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leged, high in terest loans on arbitrio taxes on domestic trade. As 
in colonial practice, the independent sta te  relied on the credit 
of monopoly-minded creditors who dem anded in re tu rn  the rev­
enue of trade taxes to secure the ir loans. Republican govern­
m ents rarely  repaid these loans in cash but granted instead to 
their creditors several privileges concerning commercial tax 
revenues which slowed trade expansion. Unlike the colonial 
sta te  the republican state  lacked an organized tax  structure. 
The resu lt was an endemic practice of deficit finance.
After independence the private sector was weak but retained 
some influence in overall political-economic m atters due to 
emergency finance mechanisms, budgetary problems, and politi­
cal instability. S tate finance had become a crucial m eans to 
form client groups of support to m ilitary caudillos in competi­
tion for the control of the state. By 1837 it was still possible to 
find some of the late colonial creditors among those who con­
tributed to emergency loans. One loan in th a t year included 
328 lenders of small individual quantities between 50 and
1.000 pesos, totalling only 66,075 pesos.22
However, in the list of the 1841-1843 loans on arbitrios the 
old nam es were more rare  to find (Quiroz 1987: 44-45). The 
1841-1843 loans on arbitrios reached totals of approxim ately
790.000 pesos, and included higher individual sum s (up to
37.000 pesos) and more lenders (553) than  previous emergency 
loans. By 1852-1855 the nam es of old creditors in loans on ar­
bitrios had practically disappeared. This change represented a 
process by which the sta te  gradually replaced its in ternal cred­
itors, from traditional groups favoring protectionism, conces­
sions and privileges, towards new groups of private lenders of 
m erchant origin w ith a more liberal outlook and foreign con­
nections (Gootenberg 1989b). The guano consignaciones (tem ­
porary lease or contract of guano sales abroad) served as a 
model for a subtle transform ation in public finance.
22 Tribunal del Consulado, "Razón rectificada de las personas acotadas p ara  el em prés­
tito  de cien mil pesos," Lima 23 Nov. 1837, BNL, Ms., 1837-D10367.
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Cash advances by the first guano contractors became another 
source of public finance. Conspicuous among the first contrac­
tors was the B ritish m erchant house of Antony Gibbs and Sons 
which rem ained the only contractor of guano to G reat B ritain 
between 1842 and 1861 (Mathew 1981: 58-60). Continued polit­
ical instability  made the financing of current government ex­
penditures through guano cash advances a custom ary practice.
The Peruvian state  in the 1825-1849 period thus combined 
the eighteenth century practice of offering fu ture fiscal rev­
enues as collateral to domestic creditors (due to the lack of for­
eign credit as a resu lt of the 1826 default) w ith the introduction 
of guano trade contracts in re tu rn  for cash advances by prim ar­
ily foreign m erchant creditors. The state, endowed w ith rights 
inherited from the colonial past, was the sole owner of the guano 
deposits in the islands off the Peruvian coast. This placed the 
Peruvian state, controlled by m ilitary groups, despite its fiscal 
problems in a position of relative strength  (Mathew 1981: 71). 
However, the sta te  guano monopoly complicated ra th e r than  
simplified fiscal debt problems by enhancing the capacity for 
m ilitary and bureaucratic expenditures through foreign credit. 
The overall linkage and redistributive effects of the guano in ­
come were thus limited (H unt 1985: 275).
Moreover, m ining finance experienced serious shortcomings 
during and after independence due to the weakness of private 
entrepreneurs, outmoded mining property legislation, and heav- 
y taxation by the state. Foreign and native m erchants supplied 
expensive credit in order to buy (rescatar) silver, the most im ­
portan t export product in Peru until the 1840s. The mine owners 
in Cerro de Pasco needed to confront credit scarcity, caudillo 
instability  and silver price control by the state  and Lima m er­
chant creditors. The mine owners united to complete in 1839 
the draining channel of Quiulacocha which had been started  in 
1806. However, in the 1850s and 1860s additional draining 
works and pum ping m achinery were needed but venture capi­
ta l had by now concentrated on the coastal region. Only the 
scarcity of metallic currency in the 1870s would revive efforts to
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exploit Peruvian mining. Despite the lim ited efforts of private 
finance, silver mining continued to stagnate during the rest of 
the century.23
In 1850 the first effective repaym ent and servicing of the 
outstanding in ternal debt (consolidación) worked m ainly in fa­
vor of m erchant creditors and speculators. After three decades 
of neglect in the m idst of economic stagnation, the sta te  d istrib­
uted six percent interest-bearing bonds among those private 
individuals who had reparation and credit claims against the 
different independent governments since 1821. The 1850 con­
solidation did not include the colonial debt. Only those claims 
by domestic creditors who had lost property (through expro­
priation, dam age or levies) and salaries, or held any previous 
in ternal debt IOUs since independence, were entitled to be 
exchanged for bonds of consolidation.
Corruption was an integral factor in the whole process of in ­
ternal debt acknowledgement and bond issue (Quiroz 1987: 95- 
108; W itt 1987: 237-240). Venal officials and the ir m erchant 
partners obtained large am ounts in bonds through forgery, false 
recognition of claims and other illegal means, and rapidly sold 
the ta in ted  bonds to avoid prosecution. These persons were in­
dicted after an official inquiry in 1855 although few of them  
were effectively punished.24 Beneath the surface, the corrup­
tion of the consolidation process was the expression of the po­
litical struggle between the opposing clienteles of m ilitary cau­
dillos José R. Echenique and Ramón Castilla. Popular protest 
and outraged public opinion arose as a resu lt of the shady con­
solidation politics.
In the business realm, notable domestic and foreign m er­
chants acquired old and new bonds a t initially low quotations 
in order to speculate and press for the rise in their value. Mer­
chants were also allowed to pay part of their customs dues with
23 H unt (1985: 262-264); Quiroz (1987: 23-25); Deustua Carvallo (1986); Casós (1876: 
92-103, 113); South  Pacific Times (Callao, Sept. 30, 1875), in: CFB, vol. 3, p. 76; Star  
& Herald  (London, Mar. 8, 1878), in: CFB, vol. 7, p. 176.
24 Comisión Especial del Crédito Público, Perú (1856); Junta  de Examen Fiscal, Perú 
(1857); El Peruano (Lima, Oct. 31 and Nov. 4, 1857).
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in ternal debt bonds. These privileged negotiators of bonds dis­
placed the original creditors by buying out their claims, and 
thus m aking the consolidation m easure for a better distribution 
of w ealth in Peru ineffectual. On the contrary, an exclusive 
m ercantile élite achieved influence through the consolidation 
to press for improved conditions of debt repaym ent and liberal 
economic reforms (Quiroz 1987).
In 1852 a group of mostly notable m erchants controlled 38 
percent of a representative sample of in ternal debt bonds. By 
1857 the ir control had risen to 51 percent (see Table 3). The 
concentration of bonds among m erchants, apart from specula­
tion and political lobbying, was due to credit repaym ents and 
loan guarantees offered by debtors, especially indebted land­
owners, in the form of in ternal debt bonds. Additionally, the 
liberation of slaves was financed in 1855 by manum ission bonds 
which were used by landowners in a sim ilar way as the in ternal 
debt bonds. A partia l financial recovery of the agricultural sec­
tor can thus be traced to the release of funds by the consolida­
tion and manum ission transactions (Engelsen 1977: 57-58; 
Quiroz 1987: 159-165). However, a more productive use of these 
funds was prevented by the absence of an institu tional financial 
framework, which started  to appear only w ith the first banks 
in the 1860s.
Several m erchants and speculators involved in the consolida­
tion participated in yet another controversial transaction: the 
partia l conversion of the in ternal debt into 4.5 percent interest- 
bearing foreign debt bonds issued in London. Approximately 38 
percent (9 million pesos) of the 24 million pesos (£ 4.8 million) 
total in ternal consolidated debt was converted in 1853.25 Only 
a handful of well-connected m erchants and speculators partici­
pated in the conversion. In 1854 some members of the London 
stock exchange objected to the admission of the Peruvian con­
verted domestic bonds because "two th irds of this debt...was
25 D ancuart (1902-03,V: 46-48); M endiburu (1959-61: 167); El Peruano (Lima, Mar. 31, 
1857). If the  converted debt to the  Tacna-Arica railroad contractor Joseph Hegan 
(two million pesos, not included in the consolidation) is added, the am ount of the 
conversion in 1853-1854 totals eleven million pesos (see Table 4).
Public D ebt an d  the  Dom estic F inanc ia l S tru c tu re  in  P eru 389
made in an irregular m anner through fraudulent m eans, by the 
favourites of the present government."26 However, native and 
foreign creditors in Lima petitioned jointly in favor of servicing 
both the converted and non-converted in ternal debt w ithout 
exception. President Castilla complied in 1857, pressed by his 
rich supporters and by in ternal political difficulties.27 Despite 
the proven legal irregularity  of the transaction, the Peruvian 
government continued honoring the in terests and am ortization 
(four percent sinking fund) of the converted debt through its fi­
nancial agents in London, Antony Gibbs and Sons.
Table 3: Social Background of Major Consolidation Bondholders,
1850-1857
Boundholders
1850-1852 1857
No. Amount3 % No. Am ount3 %
1. M erchants 45 6.05 38 25 2.36 51
2. Landowners 21 2.75 17 4 0.28 6
3. Govt, officials 21 2.05 13 - - -
4. U rban owners 12 1.93 12 4 0.35 8
5. M unificent inst. 2 0.36 2 2 0.27 6
6. Ecclesias. inst. 1 0.21 1 2 0.24 5
7. Professionals 1 0.04 - 1 0.07 1
9. O thers6 5 1.57 10 - - -
10. No inform ation 18 0.97 6 16 1.04 23
Total
(% of total debt)
126 15.93
(66)
100 54 4.60
(42)
100
a Millions of nominal pesos in vales de consolidación. 
b Including debts to Chile and heirs of Simón Bolívar.
Sources: Quiroz (1987: tables 8 and 19); "Libro de la deuda in terna  consoli­
dada..." and "Liquidación de intereses...," AGN, Libros M anuscritos Repu­
blicanos, H-4-1966 and H-4-2031.
26 "Objections of Thornton, Richmond and others th a t it is not advisable to adm it do­
mestic debt of any nation and particularly  of Peru," 28 Aug. 1854, GLL, Hambros 
Bank Ltd., Ms. 19,156.
27 Quiroz (1987: 62-63); El Peruano (Lima, Feb. 19, 1857).
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Table 4: E stim ated Peruvian (Internal and External) Public Debt, 
1821-18803 (Millions of Pesos of 1850)b
Years Mer­
chant0
Arbi­
trios
Conso­
lidar
Manu-
mis.
Banks
Total
Inter­
nal
Guano Loans
Total
Exter­
nal
1821 0.5 (14.5)d
1825 II 9.1 9.1
1830 1.2 1.2 II "
1835 0.2 0.4 0.6 II "
1840 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.3 " 9.4
1845 1.1 1.0 4.8 6.9 0.2 II 9.3
1850 1.3 6.6 7.9 1.8 19 20.8
(1852) (24.0) (24.0) ( l l ) e
1855 12.4 7.9 20.3 2.0 25 27
1860 7.8 1.8 9.6 5.9 27.5 33.4
1865 (12.5)f 12.5 45 45
1870 60 60
1875 11 11 185 185
1880 48 48 250 250
a Approximations to nearest year, according to source used, 
b In 1862 Peruvian currency changed to soles. To account for deprecia­
tion, figures in  table are adjusted to exchange rate  £ 1  = 5 pesos. 
c Includes loans and abonos, 
d Includes colonial debt and secuestros, 
e Conversion of in ternal to external debt 1853-54. 
f  Guano advances.
Sources: Gootenberg (1989b), Quiroz (1987), M athew (1981), Palacios Mo- 
reyra  (1983), D ancuart (1902-03), Marichal (1989), Yepes del Castillo 
(1972), Cam prubí Alcázar (1957).
The conversion of the in ternal to external debt reinforced the 
new financial strategy away from internal finance and towards 
renewed external finance. In 1849 the three percent deferred 
Anglo-Peruvian debt had been settled and was substitu ted  later, 
in 1853, by new 4.5 percent bonds brokered by the London firms
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Cristobal de M urrieta and Co. and C. J. Hambro and Son.28 In 
short, due to corruption and conversion m easures the in ternal 
debt m echanism  was thoroughly ruined as a potential local and 
democratic vehicle of public finance for future purposes. In con­
sequence, the Peruvian state  renewed its reliance on foreign 
debt m echanism s and only used in ternal indebtedness in critical 
situations w ith mostly ruinous effects on the national economy 
and the private sector.
A detailed trea tm en t (Quiroz 1987) of the in ternal debt a r­
rangem ent and repaym ent between 1850 and 1865 challenges 
the point of view of Bonilla (1974), Cotier (1978) and Tantaleán 
(1983) who consider th a t the consolidation and conversion were 
m easures designed to fund a new domestic élite for fu ture guano 
ren tier ventures. On the contrary, evidence shows th a t the 
funds released by the consolidation were rapidly concentrated 
among creditor m erchants despite official designs to benefit po­
litical clienteles. These m erchants had previous accumulation 
patterns and foreign connections backed by trade and specula­
tion in a capital- and currency-scarce economy.
Two im portant local m erchant creditors were the Chilean 
Pedro Gonzales Candamo and the Spaniard Ju lián  Zaraconde- 
gui.29 They participated intensely in the consolidation and con­
version deals, engaged in im port and credit activities and kept 
very good friends among the m ilitary caudillos. Zaracondegui 
was also very active in politics and m erchant guild leadership. 
These men contributed very little to the formation of a national 
élite because the ir main motivation under the circumstances of 
a weakened private sector was individualistic ra th e r than  
group or class oriented. A comment by a fellow m erchant and 
partner in 1858 is quite revealing:
Don Pedro Gonzales Candamo had a well known tactic in Lima's
commerce of obtaining all possible gains and guarantees w ithout
28 Correspondence, prospectus, application, allotm ent lists, receipts re la ting  to 1853 
substitution, GLL, Hambros B ank Ltd., Ms. 19,156.
29 Clavero (1904); Quiroz (1987: 191-197); Zaracondegui & Co. w ent bankrup t in 1874, 
Camprubí Alcázar (1957: 52-53).
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labour nor responsibility in capital concerns....Don Ju lián  Zara- 
condegui...wanted absolute control and no scruples in business 
m anagem ent....señor Candamo usually took a revolver w ith him 
in his rare  visits to Zaracondegui's office, and señor Zaracondegui 
had his always ready: th is was the m easure of understanding and 
harm ony in which my two partners lived -  two of the highest per­
sons in Lima's trade (Argumaniz Muñoz Ms. 1858-68,111: 5, 14).
These two m erchants had in terests in the first guano con­
tracts as well as in all kinds of other trade business, initial ra il­
road investm ent, and even some failed m anufacturing ventures. 
Due to the existing capital and monetary scarcity before 1850 
they had granted loans a t between 18 and 24 percent annual 
interest, and negotiated their own drafts w ith success (Campru- 
bí Alcázar 1957: 3-4; Rodulfo 1861). They were good friends of 
President Castilla, the caudillo who, w ith the help of guano 
contracts and revenues, centered government control in Lima 
against regional atom ization.30
Despite the individualism  of Gonzales Candamo and Zara­
condegui, a second generation of assertive private capitalists 
appeared in the 1860s and 1870s.31 Their main economic activ­
ities were guano contracts, trade, commercial agriculture, m in­
ing and eventually banking. These men played an im portant 
role in the channelling of funds into the sugar, cotton and 
n itra te  export sectors through note-issuing as well as in the 
commercial and mortgage banks which appeared in Peru since 
the early 1860s (Greenhill and Miller 1973; Bonilla 1986).
30 Regal (1967); Dulanto Pinillos (1945: 128); Clavero (1904: 38); AGN, Protocolos no­
tariales, Felipe Orellana, 1865, no. 500, f. 224v.
31 Men like Felipe Barreda, José Canevaro, Carlos Delgado, Felipe Gordillo, Manuel 
Pardo and Clemente Villate: Mathew (1981: 186-189, 194).
Public D ebt an d  th e  D om estic F inancia l S tru c tu re  in  P eru 393
3. T h e G uano A ge P r iv a te  B a n k s
If there had  not been banks, if  "credit" had not been used, if 
transactions had been limited to w hat was perm itted by the me­
tallic currency, would agriculture and trade had achieved the le­
vel they have today? (Blume 1876: 12).
The Guano Period has been defined as a case of developmental 
"failed opportunity."32 However, the guano income had some 
economic repercussions which have not been sufficiently ana­
lyzed. Probably the most im portant effects of the private use of 
guano income by the 1860s was a noticeable agrarian  recovery 
and the institutionalization of credit in banks, which provided 
much needed financial and monetary instrum ents and contrib­
uted to the transfer of funds between the commercial and ex­
port sectors of the Peruvian economy.
The first banks appeared in Lima due to the enhanced finan­
cial and m onetary needs of commercial activities during the 
m ature phase (1860-1879) of the Guano Period. The use of com­
mercial bills (vales a la vista) had increased considerably a- 
mong Lima m erchants to compensate for m onetary scarcity. The 
chronic export of silver currency due to trade imbalances and 
the rise of the in ternational price of silver since 1848 had re­
inforced the circulation of debased national and Bolivian coins 
(.moneda feble).33 M onetary instability thus contributed to the 
circulation of commercial bills which were used by m erchants 
as a more reliable m eans of paym ent (Rodulfo 1861: 8-10). How­
ever, in the 1860s the circulation of bank notes freely conver­
tible into silver provided a better institu tional guarantee for 
monetary paym ents than  the commercial bills. Additionally, 
the national currency was reformed in 1855, 1857 and 1862- 
1863 in order to discourage its exportation and to w ithdraw  the 
moneda feble from circulation (Moreyra-Paz Soldán 1962-63; 
Conversión, Perú  1864: 6).
32 On th is issue see Méndez G. (1987) and subsequent discussion; Rodriguez Pastor 
(1989); Engelsen (1977: 52-57).
33 E. M. (1859); Quiroz (1987: 117-119); Moreyra-Paz Soldán (1962-63).
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The first note-issuing bank, the Banco de la Providencia, 
started  its activities in Lima in 1862. Soon other issuing banks 
appeared, the most im portant being the Banco del Perú  and 
Banco Nacional. These banks issued their private notes which 
circulated as money w ithout regulation or control by the state.
Local banks granted commercial loans and discounted bills 
w ith the guarantee of either two well-established commercial 
co-signers or w ith one co-signer and sufficient collateral in the 
form of public debt bonds, stock of guano consignment compa­
nies, IOUs of th ird  persons and other stock and financial assets 
(which were kept in custody by the bank until the loan was 
fully repaid). As a consequence of these financial activities ap­
proxim ately 42 million soles (S/.) in stock and bonds existed in 
the Lima capital m arket in 1874. These securities included the 
stock of 12 banks and various companies: 3 insurance, 4 ra il­
road, 4 gas, 3 guano consignment, 2 im migration, 3 n itra te  and 
9 various other companies (Camprubí Alcázar 1957: 119-120).
U nder this initial liberal banking system, however, private 
bank adm inistrators had ample opportunity to abuse the confi­
dence of depositors and stockholders. Domingo Porras, m anag­
er of the Banco de la Providencia, led his institu tion into severe 
liquidity problems in February 1866 when it had to suspend 
operations until 1867. Porras had illicitly appropriated cash, 
disguised w ithdraw als w ith valueless or false credit documents, 
and faked the w ithdraw al from circulation of excess notes, for a 
total am ount of SI. 747,934 (40 percent of the bank's capital!). 
Protests by the bank's clients followed, dem anding appropriate 
backing of bank notes, increased official supervision and legis­
lation to lim it indiscrim inate issues by banks.34 "Frankly," 
wrote a m erchant in 1868, "except for the Banco del Perú, the 
other banks do not inspire great confidence because the ir m an­
agers are young men w ithout either capital or experience" 
(Argumaniz Muñoz Ms. 1858-1868,IV: 5).
O ther critics blamed local banks, especially the Banco del 
Perú, of forming a monopoly, or "financial dictatorship," led by
34 Banco de la Providencia (1868); U na víctima de la Providencia (1866).
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the joint in terests of guano contractors and bankers who took 
advantage of a lack of appropriate banking legislation.35 The 
Banco del Perú, w ent through difficult times due to the 
sizeable indebtedness of one of its im portant clients, the Eten- 
Ferreñafe Railway Company. This company had raised S/. 
720,000 in public stock and S/. 600,000 in additional eight per­
cent in terest bonds w ith the mortgage of its tangible assets as 
a guarantee. Among the creditors of the railroad firm there 
were im portant directors of the Banco del Perú who, in 1872, 
granted an exceptional one-year term  loan and additional cur­
ren t account credit for a total of SI. 643,000 (16 percent of the 
bank's capital). These loans had low profit expectations due to 
competition from a rival railroad and the poor financial s itua­
tion of the Eten-Ferreñafe Company. By 1876 the Banco del 
Perú was still debating w hether it should become the owner of 
the E ten-Ferreñafe Company (Banco del Perú 1876).
However, despite such cases of dishonesty and nepotism a- 
mong m anagers and directors, the issuing banks of the Guano 
Age filled an im portant vacuum and assisted the mobilization 
of capital w ithin the Peruvian export economy. Furtherm ore, 
mortgage banking credit aided the revitalization of the post- 
1840 coastal agriculture.
In the late colonial times traditional ecclesiastical credit in 
the form of censos had provided support to an aristocratic land­
owning class only m arginally in terested  in commercial agricul­
ture. The Bourbon reform of a portion of ecclesiastical liens of­
fered more opportunities for landowners to exploit landed es­
ta tes commercially (as in the case of the landowning families 
Orué y Mirones and Carrillo de Albornoz). Peruvian sugar then 
became a strategic merchandise th a t consolidated the Pacific 
trade w ith Chilean wheat. This trade pattern  continued in the 
early post-independence period, although with serious lim itati­
ons.36
35 Cisneros (1939: 227-228), reprin t of El negociado Dreyfus (Le Havre, 1870).
36 Pando (1833); Gootenberg (1989b: 34-46); Engelsen (1977: 31-33); Flores Galindo 
(1984: 48-53).
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W ith independence, the landowning class lost most of the 
prestige and social position which it held during the colonial 
period. This was due to expropriation, scarcity of a slave labor 
force, foreign m arkets' lim itations, and credit and capital scarci­
ty in  a depressed economic situation. Hacendados were forced to 
depend on very high credit ra tes when censo and family credit 
were not available. The surviving ecclesiastical institu tions con­
tinued to lend a t low in terest rates (six percent per annum ) dur­
ing the post-independence period -  but only m arginally to agri­
culture and more to urban properties. Few hacendados were 
able to provide mortgage loans to others a t 12 percent annual 
interest. Moreover, many landowners could not raise funds be­
cause of legal uncertainties over the ir property titles caused by 
lien burdens and earlier expropriations (Engelsen 1977: 10, 18- 
19, 21).
On the other hand, m erchants provided expensive credit 
through "consignment" contracts by which the m erchant obtain­
ed the right to the hacendado's crop in exchange for a short­
term  credit a t 18-24 percent annual interest, or through direct 
loans a t 24-30 percent annual interest. By the 1850s consign­
m ent credit had become a norm in order to commercialize sug­
ar and cotton crops, as exemplified in the close business relation­
ship between lender Pedro Gonzales Candamo and hacendado 
Fernando Carrillo de Albornoz, and Zaracondegui's cotton 
consignment deals w ith Ramón Aspillaga (Quiroz 1987: 155- 
157; Argumaniz Muñoz Ms. 1858-68,111: 16).
The 1850 consolidation of the in ternal debt nominally pro­
vided the landowners w ith up to three million pesos in bonds as 
compensation for expropriations and destructions th a t had oc­
curred during the first decades of independence. However, 
most of these funds -  as we have seen -  passed into the hands 
of the ir m erchant creditors to repay previous debts or as collat­
eral for new loans (as in the credit granted by Lachambre and 
Company and Green Nicholson to Domingo Elias) (Engelsen 
1977: 144-145). Landowners thus reduced their participation 
among the major active in ternal debt creditors from 17 percent
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in 1850-1852 to 6 percent in 1857 (see Table 3). The 1855 
em ancipation of the slaves additionally provided landowners 
w ith up to eight million pesos in m anum ission bonds which 
were also used to repay m erchant creditors and to replace slave 
labor w ith an indentured labor force (Quiroz 1987: 159-165; 
Engelsen 1977: 58-59).
However, the decisive contribution to the provision of credit 
to commercial agriculture was the appearance of the first m ort­
gage banks. These institutions allowed a relative diversifica­
tion away from guano business among private entrepreneurs 
a t a time when, as a consequence of the U. S. Civil W ar the in ­
ternational prices of cotton were on the increase (Stew art 1970: 
25; Cisneros 1939: 23-24). Research in notarial archives estab­
lished th a t the first mortgage bank, the Banco de Crédito Hipo­
tecario (1866), lent during the 1867-1881 period approxim ately 
S/. 12 million, mostly to medium and large estates specialized 
in cotton and sugar production in the northern  and central 
coastal valleys. A second mortgage bank, the Banco Territorial 
Hipotecario, was established in 1870. These mortgage banks 
preferred to g ran t loans to ru ra l commercial properties over 
urban properties a t a ratio of 3.5 to 1. Note-issuing banks also 
lent to the agrarian  commercial sector, especially in the boom 
years of 1865-1873. Thus, by the late 1860s the in terest on 
credit to agriculturists was lowered from the custom ary m er­
chant consignment of up to 18 percent to the banking mortgage 
of 12 percent (Engelsen 1977: 167-179; Argumaniz Muñoz Ms. 
1858-68,111: 6).
The legal basis for the mortgage banks' establishm ent had 
been prepared w ith the completion of the republican disentail- 
m ent legislation which freed landed properties from censo obli­
gations. As early as 1838 the state  had decreed the substitution 
of lien credits for in ternal debt bonds, but little was done in 
practice. In 1825 the in terest on censos (rédito) was reduced 
from five to two percent; thereafter it oscillated between three 
and five percent. Later, between 1851 and 1855, the sta te  ac­
cepted in ternal debt bonds to redeem censos for the am ount of
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404,677 pesos (Quiroz 1987: 88-90). In December 1864 a new 
law was prom ulgated to allow property owners (censatarios) to 
convert up to 75 percent of their censo debts to 12 percent in ­
terest-bearing sta te  bonds (cédulas de reconocimiento). The 
state  thus assum ed the censo debts and became the exclusive 
rédito debtor to censo holders (censualistas), accounting for a 
total of S/. 800,000. This m easure encouraged the subsequent 
sale and speculation w ith the 12 percent interest-bearing bonds.
In Jan u ary  1865 the Lima ecclesiastical chapter (cabildo 
eclesiástico) protested against the 1864 law arguing th a t it was 
neither constitutional nor economically sound (because it 
weighed heavily on the state 's finances), and unjustly dam aging 
to ecclesiastical property.37 Sim ilar protests had occurred in 
1808 against the Bourbon am ortization process.
Conveniently soon after the application of the redención law, 
in A ugust 1866, the most im portant lenders and commercial 
landowners subscribed S/. 1.5 million in capital stock for the 
formation of the Banco de Crédito Hipotecario -  despite opposi­
tion by a sector of the press. The enemies of this bank argued 
th a t it would lend a t high in terest rates. The bank granted 20- 
year loans on urban  and ru ra l property a t 10.5 and 12 percent 
annual in terest, and issued mortgage bonds (cédulas hipoteca­
rias) bearing six and eight percent annual interest. The m ort­
gage debtors thus received the loans in the form of cédulas and 
were able to obtain cash by selling the bonds a t current quota­
tions to the public (approximately 88 percent of the ir nominal 
value). The bank's gross profits arose from the difference be­
tween the loan in terest and the cédula's in terest and between 
the nominal and current value of the bonds.38
In 1868 a project to form a state-sponsored mortgage bank 
was published in a clear attem pt to encroach on the agricul­
37 Cabildo M etropolitano, "Representación elevada al Arzobispo de Lima Dn. José Se­
bastián  Goyeneche y Barreda," Lima, 5 Jan . 1865, BNL, Ms., 1865-D8449; García 
Jordán  (1988); El Peruano (Lima, Dec. 17, 1864).
38 Camprubí Alcázar (1957: 61-64); T ribunal del Consulado, "Expediente relativo a la 
suscripción de accionistas del Banco de Crédito Hipotecario," Lima, 27 Aug. 1866, 
BNL, Ms., 1866-D2809.
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tu ra l consignment credit business of m erchants by offering low­
er in terest rates. This project did not succeed due to loopholes 
in the legislation concerning property rights and judicial proce­
dures for executive action on the assets of defaulted debtors 
(Santos Morales 1868).
The Banco de Crédito Hipotecario also granted loans to pay 
previous mortgages, for the purchase of properties, and for pro­
ductive improvements. Between 1870 and 1877 one debtor, 
M aría de Arauzo, an urban proprietor, renewed her loan w ith 
the bank three tim es.39 Mortgages were also granted in some 
provinces (La Libertad, Ancash, Arequipa, lea y Moquegua). As 
a result, the bank contributed to the doubling of the price of 
agricultural land for sugar production. Despite the political 
instability which almost forced the liquidation of the Banco de 
Crédito Hipotecario in 1867, the Guano Age mortgage banks 
succeeded in establishing significant links between the ag rar­
ian and commercial sectors a t least until the beginning of the 
financial crisis of 1873-1881. As a contemporary analyst a r­
gued, the competitive environm ent of Guano Age liberal 
banking seemed not to have been responsible for the financial 
crisis. (On the contrary, the crisis could have worked as a 
safety m echanism  to expel inefficient institu tions from the 
m arket.) I t was ra th e r sta te  intervention and its foreign 
indebtedness which precipitated such a crisis and bailed out 
the inefficient and unsound firms (Blume 1876: 11).
4. F o r e ig n  P u b lic  D eb t P ro b lem s, 1850-1879
The liberal conditions of the early Peruvian private banking sys­
tem  evolved alongside the state  monopoly over guano deposits 
and deficit-led fiscal finance. This contradiction a t the core of 
the transitional export economy continued to place serious li­
mits on the development of a strong private sector despite the 
opportunities offered by the guano income.
39 "Obligación de la Sra. Da. M aría de Arauzo al Banco de Crédito Hipotecario," 17 
Mar. 1870, BNL, Ms., 1870-D12763.
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U ntil 1869 the external public debt was kept under relative 
control by stric t guarantees on guano revenues adm inistrated 
by private financial agents in monopolistic conditions. Between 
1849 and 1861 Antony Gibbs and Company had made sure to 
satisfy in terest and am ortization paym ents to foreign credi­
tors.40 Such prom ptness was in the in terest of political stability 
and in ternational support for governments which strove to 
m aintain  good national credit abroad.
The native guano contractors which replaced Gibbs in 1861 
also hired the services of a foreign firm, Thomson Bonar & 
Company, to handle the Peruvian external debt in London. The 
external debt conversions and loans of 1862 and 1865 provided 
fresh money for current governmental expenditures. The loans 
brought a wave of controversial allegations. One negotiator of 
the 1865 loan of £ 10 million, the liberal future President Ma­
nuel Pardo, had family ties w ith the native partners of Thom­
son Bonar. Moreover, the London firm was sued by the Peru­
vian government in 1872 for charging unfair commissions of up 
to £ 46,700 in the brokerage of the 1862 and 1865 loans.41
Guano contractors charged up to 35 percent in interest, com­
missions and other charges on short-term  loans advanced to 
the government between 1864 and 1869. The state  rem ained in 
constant need and some officials thought th a t private native 
and foreign lenders were tak ing  advantage of the sta te  (Cisne­
ros 1939: 213-221, 365). By 1869 the fiscal guano revenues had 
achieved very little in term s of domestic in frastructure and de­
velopment while public deficit had am ounted to S/. 17 million. 
Most of the proceeds of the short and long-term loans were con­
sumed by bureaucratic and m ilitary expenditures and the costs 
of commissions and in terests (H unt 1985: 275-276).
40 "Documentos de las operaciones financieras realizadas entre el Gobierno peruano y 
la  C asa Gibbs," Lima, Aug. 1858, BNL, Ms., 1858-D2214.
41 Ruzo (1872), citing earlier criticisms against Pardo by Bogardus. Also "Sobre el ju i­
cio seguido por la Inspección Fiscal del Perú en Europa contra los Sres. Thomson 
Bonar y Cía. relativo al cobro indebido de comisiones por em préstitos correspondien­
tes a los años 1862-65. París 26 enero 1874," BNL, Ms., 1874-D3254.
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P art of the problem of the public sector's dependence on the 
advances of the guano contractors and external bonds credit was 
the undeveloped tax  structure. Customs and silver taxes were 
insufficient to provide an in ternal autonomy of revenues. Guano 
was therefore increasingly used as a fiscal guarantee to a ttrac t 
external credit. As early as 1855, tax reform ists had w arned 
against the excessive reliance on guano revenues (Basadre 
1971: III). Moreover, the Indian poll tax  had been abolished in 
1854. Also, since the abandonm ent of in ternal debt strategies 
by 1850-1854, auxiliary trade taxes had been curtailed. How­
ever, any small attem pt a t introducing tax  reforms and taxes 
based on income was vehem ently repudiated by different social 
sectors. In 1866, the plan of the M inister of Finance, M anuel 
Pardo, to institu te  new taxes on capital and labor suffered re ­
lentless attacks. Pardo's original tax reform achieved only the 
establishm ent of new export and indirect taxes which re ­
m ained in use until the 1890s.42
The liberal revival of 1866-1868 ebbed and was replaced by a 
trad itionalist reaction led by colonel José B alta who became 
President in 1868. This was, however, a conservative govern­
m ent w ith a difference. B alta adopted an apparently  "develop­
mental" attitude. His strategy and th a t of his M inisters of F i­
nance was to augm ent the external debt to a disproportionate 
level w ith respect to the increasingly unreliable but still m ort­
gageable guano revenues. The justification for this rested  on 
the rejection of the guano contract system and the need to de­
velop a national railroad system. The burden of the increased 
foreign indebtedness would be simply transferred  to the next 
governments. In only one year, between 1871 and 1872 the Pe­
ruvian external debt increased dram atically from S/. 90 million 
(£ 18 million) to S/. 185 million (£ 37 million); the debt had been 
only £ 9 million in 1865 (Palacios Moreyra 1983: 190-197) (see 
also Table 4). The annual service of the external debt thus in ­
42 López (1947: 3, 13-18); San Cristóbal (1945: 14, 19-24); M anuel Pardo, Memoria que 
el ex-Secretario de Estado en el despacho de Hacienda y  Comercio presenta al Jefe 
Supremo Provisorio de la República (1867), in: López (1947: 327-399).
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creased to S/. 13.5 million in 1872, clearly rendering insuffi­
cient the S/. 15 million in guano revenues of th a t year (Dulanto 
Pinillos 1947: 104).
The origin of the 1870s debt spiral was the signing of the 
Dreyfus contract in 1869. The traditionally-m inded M inister of 
Finance Nicolás de Piérola set the tone by displacing the do­
mestic guano contractors and bankers from the adm inistration 
of guano revenue funds. The native capitalists were replaced 
by a single French firm, Dreyfus Frères et Compagnie, which 
was contracted to sell two million tons of guano in re tu rn  for 
advances to the deficitary government. The Peruvian Congress 
sanctioned th a t the Dreyfus contract exceeded the congressio­
nal authorization for deficit arrangem ents. The displaced con­
tractors, the "hijos del pais," fought the new contract in a 
national court which was powerless against the executive 
decision.43 The head of the French house, Auguste Dreyfus,44 
had financial backing from a group of bankers in Paris (Société 
Générale, Leiden Premsel) and London (J. Henry Schröder and 
Company). Huge advances were supplied by the speculative 
Dreyfus who strove to monopolize the guano business at all 
costs. Dreyfus also became the financial agent of the Peruvian 
debt in Europe (Bonilla 1974: 69-116). Unlike Gibbs, Dreyfus 
was not careful in calculating safe guano guarantees for the 
expanded credit to the Peruvian government.
Piérola has been seen by sym pathetic historians (Bonilla 
1974: 74-76; Ulloa 1949; Dulanto Pinillos 1947) as a popular 
leader who was able to displace a ren tis t élite which took ad­
vantage of fiscal business to advance their own interests. How­
43 "Sobre las m edidas a adoptarse para  cubrir el déficit del Presupuesto de la Repú­
blica," Lima, 7 Sept. 1869, BNL, Ms., 1869-D2655.
44 On the origins and credit worthiness of Auguste Dreyfus' business in Peru one can 
read the following report of the Lima branch of Antony Gibbs & Sons to their Lon­
don seniors on 12 Aug. 1863: the Dreyfus' house "have h itherto  done [import] busi­
ness through Templeman & Bergman...it is now their intention to set up store 
separate from T & B. We don't know w hat m eans they may have, not in fact much 
about them  bu t we should recommend caution in case they should enter into busi­
ness relation w ith you," in: "Private information book on m erchant firms, chiefly for­
eign 1859-1902," GLL, Antony Gibbs & Sons, Ms. 11038B.
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ever, he can be seen in a different light if we consider his con­
servative background. Piérola was the son of a Spanish edu­
cated scholar who turned  politician and state  bureaucrat and 
served as controversial M inister of Finance under President 
Echenique in 1853. Before occupying the same post as his fa­
ther did sixteen years earlier, the young Piérola had been a 
sem inarist of traditional education and convictions closely 
linked to the conservative caudillos Echenique and B alta (Du- 
lanto Pinillos 1947: 57-61). Piérola became the civilian heir to 
the caudillo tradition which was bitterly opposed to the liberal 
civilianist party  and its leader, M anuel Pardo. Unlike Pardo's 
reform ist attem pts, Piérola was in favor of continuing foreign 
debt finance in order to m aintain the independence of fiscal 
finances and his political clients' manoeuvres.45
According to Piérola's wishes an external loan contract was 
signed w ith Dreyfus in 1870 for almost £ 12 million. This loan 
at six percent in terest was m ainly used to finance the railroad 
projects of contractor Henry Meiggs, a yankee Pizarro, for the 
lines Lima-Oroya and Mollendo-Arequipa-Puno. According to a 
British financial review in 1874, the Peruvian railroad system 
was "unsurpassed in 'grandeur', costliness, and total hopeless­
ness of profit returns."46 Despite the increase in the foreign 
debt as a resu lt of the 1870 loan, Piérola em barked in 1871 on 
another loan contract w ith Dreyfus for essentially conversion 
purposes.
In the m inutes of a meeting of the Council of M inisters in 
July  1871, handw ritten  by Piérola himself, one can read the 
persuasive and im perative argum ents which he used to con­
vince the other m inisters to approve a new loan. He argued 
th a t the conversion of previous foreign public debts (the 1865 
loan, the 1866 Chile-Peru debt, and the six percent in terest 
bonds of 1870 floated a t a price of 82.5 percent) was possible
45 L ater on Piérola had in terests in the  Banco Nacional, financed by Dreyfus and com­
petitor of the  Banco del Perú which was co-owned by M anuel Pardo, Piérola's politi­
cal enemy, Ulloa (1949: 84-90); Camprubí Alcázar (1957: 90-96).
46 Stock Exchange Review  (London, June, 1874), in: CFB, vol. 1, p. 242.
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and urgently needed. The reasons given were (a) to m eet debt 
services and current expenditures on public works and the po­
lice; (b) to allow tim e for the expected proceeds from the ra il­
roads to materialize; and (c) because there was no legal impedi­
m ent for including a conversion loan in the £ 15 million au thor­
ized by Congress in February 1871. This authorization was 
earm arked for railroad and irrigation works only. According to 
Piérola, since the in terest of the conversion loan would be one 
percent lower than  th a t of 1870, it was therefore w ithin the 
congressional condition of contracting advantageous public 
loans!47 In accordance once again w ith Piérola's designs a new 
loan contract was signed w ith Dreyfus in Ju ly  1871. However, 
the sudden in terruption of the negotiations days la te r on the 
orders of P resident B alta brought the im m ediate resignation of 
Piérola. It is not clear w hether the disagreem ent between the 
President and his m inister was due to personal in terests 
involved in the loan negotiations.
Only in December 1871 was a new deal arranged w ith Drey­
fus, w ithout Piérola's participation, which raised the loan 
am ount to £ 36.8 million (Palacios Moreyra 1983: 128-132). 
This m am m oth "consolidated" loan bore five percent in terest 
and was floated a t the low price of issue of 77.5 percent.48 
Everything was set to raise the funds in the London, Paris and 
A m sterdam  m arkets early in 1872 when a le tter by the Peru­
vian citizen Carlos Elias was made public in European news­
papers claiming the illegality of the loan transaction and the 
impossibility of its repaym ent by a poor country such as Peru. 
D istrust quickly spread among bankers and investors and, 
consequently, the loan operation stum bled and came to a 
halt.49 Only £ 15 million were initially allowed to be floated by 
the London stock exchange committee. The rem aining portion 
was arduous allocated during the next months.
47 Consejo de M inistros, 13 Ju ly  1871 session, BNL, Ms., D4674.
48 "Peruvian Governm ent 5 % consolidated loan 1872," prospect signed by J. Henry 
Schröder & Co., in: CFB, vol. 1.
49 "Memorandum de la operación financiera de 1872 de £ 36,000,000," BNL, Ms., 
D4655.
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Observers commented th a t the 1872 loan "cannot be term ed 
a satisfactory success. Bonds have been sold, it is true, thanks 
to the vigorous and untiring efforts of the syndicate [backing 
the loan]...but the figure a t which the loan had been floated in 
the greater p a rt is not flattering to the credit of the republic."50 
It is precisely in 1873 th a t the London bondholders began to 
protest against the "unjustifiable depreciation" of the Peruvian 
external bonds.51 The quotation of Peruvian foreign loan bonds 
in London had been already declining by 1872 together w ith 
other Latin  American bonds (M aiguashca Ms. 1967; M arichal 
1989: 108-111).
Contemporaries had no trouble pointing out the flaws in the 
use of the Peruvian foreign debt to cover current expenditures, 
refinance previous loans, and carry out colossal railroad proj­
ects of uncertain  returns. The increased foreign debt also cre­
ated wider opportunities for corruption -  a constant though 
"invisible" factor in Latin American public indebtedness. The 
politicization of the public debt became a serious problem, due 
to frequent deadlock in Congress between opposing sides and 
the impulsive actions of the executive. It was only a m atter of 
time until private banking capital was "pulled into the unfortu­
nate destiny of public finance" (Camprubí Alcázar 1957: 125, 
145-156). As one observer commented in 1876:
It has been several years now th a t Peru has been slipping 
towards the abyss....W hat has pushed Peru in th a t direction? The 
careless loans, the banking m ania, the railw ay m ania and, above 
all, the w itchcraft remedies used against such follies and others; 
in a word, the contempt towards m ercantile principles (Blume 
1876: 3).
The sudden inflow of foreign capital had triggered a tempo­
rary  banking boom between 1869 and 1872. In 1869 there were 
only three banks of issue (one was the Banco del Perú, co­
owned by Pardo) and one mortgage bank. However, in 1873
there were sixteen m ain bank offices (13 issuing, two m ort­
50 The Pacific M ail (Dec. 1, 1873), in: CFB, vol. 1, p. 54.
51 The Pacific M ail (Dec. 1, 1873), in: CFB, vol. 1.
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gage, one savings), six branches and five agencies (Camprubi 
Alcázar 1957: 119, 217). Discount ra tes declined from 15 per­
cent in 1869 to 6-8 percent depending on the m aturity , which 
could be of up to six months. Cam prubi considered th is to be a 
banking "hypertrophy" out of proportion w ith the Peruvian 
economy (Cam prubi Alcázar 1957: 129).
Serious domestic financial and m onetary problems appeared 
coincidentally w ith the world recession of 1873. According to 
Pardo, Peru experienced m onetary difficulties since 1872 due 
to inflationary pressure linked to foreign indebtedness.52 The 
resulting  tendency was an outflow of silver currency due to 
trade deficits, and therefore the issuing banks could not easily 
pay note holders w ith silver currency and provide bills of 
exchange on London (Blume 1876: 7-8). In August 1875 the 
domestic banks had to suspend the specie paym ent of their 
note obligations. The causes of the suspension were observed to 
be caused by "the extreme scarcity of exchange on Europe 
which rendered it absolutely necessary for m erchants to make 
the ir rem ittances in silver coin, bar-silver or foreign gold."53 
Foreign companies faced, apart from depressed commercial 
conditions, difficulties in rem itting their considerable profits 
abroad (in some cases profits of up to 60 percent annual 
average for the 1868-1873 period).54 A foreign m erchant wrote 
in M arch 1876:
The sta te  of business m atters in general shows no signs of im­
provem ent and sales are extremely dull. Were it not for the large 
exportation of sugar it would be impossible to obtain rem ittances 
as w ith the exception of a small quantity  of bar silver there is 
nothing else in the open m arket to draw for.55
Paradoxically the liberal President M anuel Pardo had to deal 
w ith the im m inent banking and fiscal failure of 1875-1876. The
52 The Financier (Sept. 22, 1874), in: CFB, vol. 1.
53 S ta r & Herald (London, Aug. 21, 1875), in: CFB, vol.2, p. 342.
54 Profit earnings of H uth G running partnership, 1868-1873, GLL, Frederick H uth &
Co., Ms. 10, 702/4.
55 G raham  Rowe to F. H uth  & Co. (London), Lima 27 March 1876, GLL, Frederick
H uth  & Co., Ms. 10, 703/1.
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public debt service, including am ortization was suspended in 
January  1876 when new refinancing loans failed to m ateria l­
ize. The quotation of Peruvian bonds plunged from 77.5 per­
cent in 1875 to 17.15 percent in 18 76.56 U nder fiscal pressure 
the state  began to use the pledged guano revenues for current 
expenditures after the debt default. Public works were par­
alyzed. The contraction of foreign credit led to a dram atic 
re trea t of liberal financial conditions and of stable m onetary 
policies. Banking regulation had been introduced in 1873. More­
over, a thorough state  intervention in banking m atters was 
targeted as a m eans to confront the financial crisis.
The private banking sector was forced to assist the sta te  in 
the critical 1875-1879 period, beginning w ith an agreem ent be­
tween the government and the banks in September 1875.57 The 
state guaranteed the banks' m onetary issues w ith in ternal 
debt instrum ents, the banks lent S/. 18 million to the sta te  in 
rapidly depreciating paper currency. Bank notes were declared 
legal tender of m andatory inconvertible circulation, backed by 
valueless consolidated in ternal debt instrum ents (Blume 1876: 
8). The establishm ent of a central bank was criticized and fear­
ed.58 U ltim ately in August 1877 the state  converted the private 
bank notes into a national currency, the billetes fiscales, which 
continued to depreciate even further (Cam prubí Alcázar 1957: 
321-329). The banks continued lending to the state  until 1880. 
Thus public and narrow private in terests found new ways to 
cover up their respective inefficiencies.
Inflated in ternal credit thus replaced the lack of foreign capi­
ta l inflow. Absolute fiscal and banking collapse was avoided 
but inflation loomed together w ith currency depreciation as 
well as long- and short-term  credit conditions foundered. As a 
press reporter informed in 1878 "Peru suffered from the neces­
sary consequences of im porting larger quantities of m erchan­
dise than  she had produced to pay for, and of having nothing
56 The B ullionist (Apr. 15, 1876), in: CFB, vol. 4.
57 South Pacific Times (Callao, Sept. 10, 1875), in: CFB, vol. 5.
58 South Pacific Times (Callao, Oct. 28, 1876), in: CFB, vol. 5, p. 204.
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but a depreciated currency w ith which to make good the bal­
ance of trade against her."59
A nother example of Pardo's interventionist policy was the 
expropriation of n itra te  properties in southern Peru in March 
1875. Foreign and native private owners were affected by the 
m easure. A stock company had been jointly formed in 1873 by 
the native banks Banco del Perú, Banco Nacional and Banco de 
la Providencia to adm inistrate n itra te  commercialization at 
officially fixed prices.60 Private in terests collided w ith this a t­
tem pt to establish another public monopoly. N itrate  certifi­
cates were then  issued by the state  in paym ent for the expro­
priation of n itra te  fields in 1875. The associated banks also ad­
m inistrated  and financed the expropriation process through 
loans to the government and subcontracting the sale of monop­
oly n itra te  to Antony Gibbs and Sons.61 At the end of Pardo's 
term  in 1876 his adm inistration and interventionist policies 
were bitterly criticized in Peru and abroad.62
Between 1874 and 1876 there had been frustrated  attem pts 
to refinance the external debt. During the adm inistrations of 
P residents M anuel Pardo and M ariano Prado (1876-1879) the 
foreign debt renegotiations failed to avoid the approaching fi­
nancial collapse. After a series of fruitless deals w ith Dreyfus 
and the Société Générale, Prado signed in 1876 the Raphael 
contract under pressure from the Council of Foreign Bond­
holders and its chairm an Charles Russell (Basadre 1981: 85- 
88). The contract established th a t a foreign creditor company, 
the Peruvian Guano Company, would adm inistrate the guano 
income to service the defaulted Peruvian debt. Legal conflicts
59 Article of the  South  Pacific M ail, reprin ted  in  the B razil & River Plate Mail 
(London, Ju ly  6, 1878), in: CFB, vol. 7, p. 304.
60 Bancos del Perú, Nacional del Perú y La Providencia, "Bases que proponen para  el 
establecimiento de una  sociedad que adm inistre el Estanco del Salitre y del contrato 
que debe regir con el Supremo Gobierno," Lima, Ju ly  1873, BNL, Ms., 1873-D3504.
61 Gibbs & Sons to President of Associated Banks Delegates, Lima, 2 Dec. 1876, GLL, 
Antony Gibbs & Sons, Ms. 11,121.
62 "Que no hay remedio?..." [18741, in: Cisneros (1939,111: 361-378); S ta r & Herald 
(London, Aug. 21, 1876), CFB, vol. 5.
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w ith Dreyfus, who also had rights over the guano revenue, re­
sulted in a difficult im plem entation of the Raphael contract.63
However, there were still hopes th a t a transform ation of the 
export economy could lead to recovery and renewed possibili­
ties of development. Meiggs had found ingenious ways of finan­
cing his railroad, m ining and n itrate  projects w ith the scrip of 
his Public Work Company (totalling S/. 5.3 million) which quo­
ted higher th an  the billetes fiscales. N ational currency in cir­
culation was la ter lim ited to only S/. 20 million.64 Income from 
sugar exports eased the exchange crunch by December 1876. 
Exchange improved from 18 - 20 d. per sol to 22 - 24 d. in June 
1877.65
The W ar of the Pacific removed all rem aining hopes of recov­
ery. The Peruvian Guano Company and the Committee of P eru ­
vian Bondholders made separate financial arrangem ents with 
Chile, thus leaving Peru in the middle of the w ar w ithout fi­
nancial resources from its guano income. In a stern  and conser­
vative B ritish newspaper the epitaph of the Peruvian financial 
and m ilitary d isaster was w ritten  in 1879: "After the sham e­
less way in which Peru has played fast and loose w ith her 
creditors, she can not expect to be trea ted  as if she had been all 
along an honourable state. She will not a ttrac t the sym pathies 
of the civilised world however loudly she may protest; and 
Chili, the victorious state, is certainly entitled to exact 
compensation for her expenditures and losses."66
To make things even worse, after his coup against Prado in 
the middle of the W ar of the Pacific, Piérola u ltim ately contrib­
uted to the destruction of the local banking activities by issuing 
in 1879 the worthless incas to replace the billete fiscal. The
63 Daniel Ruzo, Im portant statement with reference to the Peruvian loans o f 1870 and  
1872 by a Peruvian bondholder (London: Green & Son, 1876), in: CFB, vol. 3.
64 South Pacific Times (Callao, June  6, 1876), in: CFB, vol. 5; and (Callao, Mar. 29,
1877), in: CFB, vol. 6; S ta r & Herald (London, Sept. 5 and 21, 1876), in: CFB, vol. 6.
Meiggs dies in 1877.
65 Brazil & River Plate M ail (London, Ju ly  6, 1878), in: CFB, vol. 7, p. 304; and 
(London, Jan . 23, 1877), in: CFB, vol. 5, p. 345.
66 The B ullionist (Dec. 13, 1879), in: CFB, vol. 9, p. 48.
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Banco G arantizador was an early casualty when, under the 
influence of some of its directors who were involved in business 
and politics w ith the Piérola regime, it converted its cash into 
incas (León 1882: 7, 33).
In conclusion, during the m ature Guano Age the private eco­
nomic and financial leadership was not able or allowed to take 
firm command of the national economy, and thus rem ained 
vulnerable to recurren t public intervention, w ith dam aging ef­
fects on the domestic m onetary and institu tional bases. Public 
and private inefficiencies were allowed to subsist through mo­
nopolistic and privileged arrangem ents. Failed traditional debt 
and fiscal strategies prepared the conditions for the decline in 
the effectiveness of domestic financial interm ediation.
5. L ib era l B a n k in g  R e c o n str u c t io n
After the loss of the war, due in part to the financial difficulties 
during the late Guano Age (Quiroz 1983), the defaulted 1876 
foreign public debt was settled in 1890 by surrendering the n a­
tional railroad system and other rights of sovereignty to foreign 
creditors (Miller 1976). After a profound restructuring  the Pe­
ruvian sta te  became more economical w ith minimal expendi­
tures, no foreign credit, and financed until 1905 by indirect tax ­
ation and stric t commercial loans granted by local banks.
The postw ar domestic élite now had ample opportunities to 
engage in business w ithout two m ain encum brances typical of 
the late Guano Period: a depreciated currency and a large pub­
lic debt. W ith a sound m onetary policy, first based on silver and 
then, around 1897-1901, changed to the gold s tandard  condi­
tions were optimal for the institu tional growth of the banking 
structure (Payán 1892; G arland 1908). Increased institu tional 
specialization and the gold standard  created conditions for the 
lowering of in terest ra tes for commercial and urban  mortgage 
credit.
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Agro-exporters were initially opposed to the introduction of 
the gold standard. They favored instead the continuation of the 
m onetary system based on silver. The in ternational price of 
silver was declining in the 1890s. Consequently native agro­
exporters benefited as recipients of foreign gold currency and 
debtors in silver currency. However, they gradually w ithdrew 
their opposition to the gold standard  when providers of funds 
and commercial services expected paym ents in gold, and a ge­
neral economic stabilization ensued (Dubois et al. 1892). Offi­
cial m onetary regulation limited itse lf to allowing the drastic 
adjustm ent m echanisms of the gold standard  (Ford 1962). The 
in terests of local banks and creditors as well as foreign m er­
chants and investors prevailed in m onetary m atters until 1914.
The only banks which avoided bankruptcy after the w ar 
were the two exclusively commercial banks, the B ritish Banco 
de Londres y México, and the native Banco del Callao (Jones 
1977; Joslin 1963). They formed the core of the new financial 
structure th a t appeared in the period known as th a t of N ation­
al Reconstruction (Quiroz 1989: 35-53). These two banks m er­
ged in 1897 to form the Banco del Perú y Londres, an in s titu ­
tion w ith a majority of native shareholders. Another th ree local 
banks and three insurance companies had been established by 
1900. In the period after the W ar of the Pacific local banks took 
on the ta sk  of arranging the private debts and defaults of firms 
as well as building the basis of urban mortgage which contrib­
uted to urban reconstruction and renovation in the 1890s and 
1900s.
The legacy of the failed note-issuing banks and long-term 
agrarian  mortgage credit of the Guano Period and a widely dif­
fused d istrust of the general economic situation after the w ar 
had lasting effects. Banking transactions rem ained strictly 
short-term  commercial, and banks were averse to agrarian  loans 
w ithout the intervention of m erchants. Commercial private 
credit was granted mainly to m erchants who financially control 
the agrarian  export sector (Klarén 1973: 5-12; Klinge 1945). 
Between 1884 and 1906 approximately 30 percent of the credit
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granted by the major local bank, the Banco del Perú y Londres, 
w ent to trade related activities, 20 percent to urban properties, 
15 percent as short term  loans to the government and public 
institutions, and 10 percent to m anufacturing.67 However, be­
tween 1907 and 1914 a shift in the bank's financial policy 
favored the flow of abundant foreign capital into the domestic 
financial structure.
Domestic financial in terests established a profitable collabo­
ration w ith foreign capital which allowed oligopolistic business 
to flourish. Private monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies 
had surfaced in Peru and Chile in the 1870s in the form of price 
agreem ents to avoid competition, especially in the n itra te  busi­
ness (Gibbs, North) and wool trade (Gibbs, Stafford).68 These 
were initial organizational tendencies which became more 
common in the 1890s.
Favored by advantageous financial and m onetary conditions, 
foreign capital flowed into Peru in the 1900s and 1910s. Debts 
to foreigners were essentially private ra th e r than  public. The 
underw riting of securities financed abroad and the im portation 
of foreign capital to finance local securities were common in the 
period 1898-1914 when the gold standard  operated. The rela­
tively small though active Lima stock m arket captured local ca­
pital essentially in the profitable stock of banks, insurance com­
panies, agro-industrial firms and cattle-rearing companies.69
The leadership of the Peruvian banking system was held by 
the Banco del Perú y Londres which absorbed B ritish and 
French capital during the years 1897-1914 in search of oligo­
polistic dominance; this endangered its native character. In 
general, the foreign presence (in collaboration w ith domestic in­
terests) in Peruvian private finances was considerable in this
67 These percentages of sectorial distribution of credit were obtained from a significant 
sample of banking transactions of the Banco del Perú y Londres (Quiroz 1989: 321- 
325).
68  GLL, Antony Gibbs & Sons, Ms. 11,121; and H arrison to W. Gibbs & Co. (Lima), 
Arequipa, 8 March 1878, GLL, Ms. 11,124: fob 96.
69 Bolsa Comercial de Lima, "Memoria anual" [1900-1914], in: Boletín de la Bolsa Co­
mercial (Lima).
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period. Crowding-out of domestic investors from profitable fi­
nancial business by foreign capital (e. g. Crédit Foncier Peru- 
vien) did occur. However, exclusively foreign financial in s titu ­
tions did not generally perform as well as native and resident 
financial firms (Quiroz 1989: 248-251).
Peruvian financial activities resulted by 1907-1914 in the 
concentration of w ealth in the form of gold. The currency was 
instrum ental in commercial and financial activities but the pop­
u lar sector resented the accumulation of gold coins by banks 
and m erchants, especially during the first years of the in tro­
duction of the gold standard  and a t the outbreak of World W ar I. 
The particu lar type of Peruvian institu tional and financial in ­
term ediary development disregarded the promotion of small 
savings and deposits. The small institutions directed a t the 
small savings m arket (charitable and religious savings houses 
and pawn brokers) did not perform efficiently in term s of in te r­
est ra te  policies for popular deposits and credit.70 Also, banking 
concentrated overwhelmingly in the Lima region, as shown by a 
77 percent average allocation of mortgage loans in the depart­
m ent of Lima during the years 1894-1907 (Quiroz 1989: 74).
Oligopolies were also helped by banks with strong foreign 
participation. Huge speculations in oligopolized securities (e. g. 
Em presas Eléctricas Asociadas) took place in the London m ar­
ket ju s t before World W ar I. Semi-private institu tions carried 
on effective tax  farm ing (although the taxation structu re re­
m ained indirect ra th e r than  direct) and the utilities and 
service enterprises were private (Quiroz Ms. 1986).
Oligopolistic in terests and the banks did not accept sta te  in ­
tervention beyond certain limits. From 1884 to 1919 fiscal finan­
ces relied considerably on local commercial credit by offering 
the concession of semi-public tax-collecting companies to private 
financial in terests. Foreign public debt had been curtailed 
drastically since 1879. However, foreign investm ent in the stock
70 Mayer de Zulen (1906: 1155); Camprubí Alcázar (1968: 4-95, 111); Inspección de Ca­
sas de Préstam o (1901: 37); Quiroz (1989: 100-109).
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of semi-public companies and foreign loans to the sta te  for 
m ilitary purposes increased between 1905 and 1914.
The financial collapse during the first m onths of World W ar I 
had a very profund effect on the private banks, which saw their 
gold reserves depleted. The sta te  was also severely affected due 
to a sudden decline in its customs revenues. This time, sta te  in ­
tervention was needed to officially guarantee the first money 
bills issued by local banks since 1879.
Between 1884 and 1914 few state-sponsored infrastructure 
works were projected. It was ra th e r the private business sector 
which benefitted from the liberal m anagem ent of the state. Po­
litical stability  contributed to this. These years saw the recovery 
and the transform ation of the sugar and cotton plantations 
tow ards expanded production, together w ith a parallel process 
of proletarianization in the coastal region. U rbanization began 
its first advances, aided by a mortgage system of credit which 
modernized the legal system of property and helped urban re­
construction after the war. It was, however, mainly private 
trade linking foreign m arkets to the interior m arkets which ben­
efited most from the development of the commercial banking 
structure of th is period.
6. C o n c lu s io n s
From the evidence shown, the following conclusions are relevant 
to the assessm ent of the significance of public debt finance for 
the private institutional, interm ediary, m onetary and distribu­
tive characteristics of the domestic financial structure in the 
two export cycles studied:
1. During the m ature Guano Age the relationship between 
the public and the private financial sector was ultim ately char­
acterized by the predominance of the state, despite the insti­
tu tional and interm ediary innovations of private note-issuing 
and agrarian  mortgage banks in the 1860s. Political strife be­
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tween liberal and traditional groups had disturbing effects on 
domestic finance, especially w ith regard to in ternal debt mech­
anism s of poor distributive effects, banking activities and mone­
tary  stability. Relatively stable m onetary policies were nega­
tively affected by state  intervention made necessary, by 1872- 
1873 because of failed foreign debt strategies. This was due in 
p art to the existence of traditional sta te  monopoly rights rooted 
in the colonial past. M ilitarized and recently re-centralized 
governments prefered to over-rely on monopoly guano revenues 
as collateral to foreign indebtedness, ra th e r th an  on local re ­
sources, tax  reform, reduced (m ilitary and bureaucratic) ex­
penditures, and more proportionate public investm ent.
2. D uring the period following the W ar of the Pacific a liber­
ally oriented private sector led the financial structure and 
strove to keep the state  from interfering w ith private business 
and finance. E xtravagant expenditure and public works were 
avoided by the state. M onetary conditions under the gold stand­
ard were stable and favorable for m erchant creditors, foreign 
and jo int investm ents in the private sector, and the expansion 
of financial institutions. Capitalist export-oriented business 
and urban  improvement were promoted basically by commer­
cial and mortgage credit. Foreign indebtedness was m ainly p ri­
vate and, by 1913, became highly speculative on over-capitalized 
oligopolistic security ventures. This financial speculation had 
adverse distributive and crowding-out effects.
3. Centralization of the financial power in Lima and the 
coastal region by the 1860s diminished the influence of the in ­
terior regions. W ealth inequality increased (Chaplin 1967), and 
domestic interm ediaries disregarded the needs of small savers 
and depositors. Institu tional development in the financial sector 
was highly weighed against a more equitable distribution of 
wealth. The second phase of income and regional development 
(i.e. redistribution of income and the overcoming of regional in ­
equalities) rem ained an unfinished ta sk  in both export cycles.
4. Public indebtedness, by favoring and m aking possible 
highly politicized sta te  intervention during the Guano Age,
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proved an obstacle to trends toward private diversification and 
accumulation beyond purely commercial ventures. The ac­
ceptance by the private economic leadership of misplaced and 
often corrupt sta te  intervention, a t a time when banks were 
menaced by a financial crisis (1873-1879), were a clear sign of 
w eakness, which had its roots in the immense damage suffered 
by the colonial private sector after independence. A firmer 
alliance between agro-exporters, m erchants and bankers was 
disturbed by public inflationary needs. The resulting opportun­
istic arrangem ent between a stronger sta te  and a w eaker pri­
vate sector in 1873-1878 perm itted the survival of the unfit 
and corrupt. On the other hand, it would seem th a t between 
1884 and 1914, export surpluses were better channeled through 
institu tional and informal private finance, despite the depen­
dence of agro-exporters on credit from m erchants and bankers. 
Moreover, in the postwar recovery period the low public indebt­
edness was ra th e r in ternal than  external in natu re compared to 
the Guano Period of high public, basically foreign indebtedness.
In general, it is pertinent to conclude th a t an unbalanced 
and foreign-biased public indebtedness affected adversely the 
Peruvian domestic financial evolution and its developmental 
consequences. This contrasts w ith the better institu tional and 
m onetary circumstances (albeit accompanied by poor w ealth 
distribution results) offered by the m oderate and manageable 
public debt in the period after the W ar of the Pacific.
